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Despite intensive ongoing research, key aspects of the spatial-temporal evolution of the 2001 foot and mouth disease (FMD)
epidemic in Great Britain (GB) remain unexplained. Here we develop a Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) method for
estimating epidemiological parameters of the 2001 outbreak for a range of simple transmission models. We make the
simplifying assumption that infectious farms were completely observed in 2001, equivalent to assuming that farms that were
proactively culled but not diagnosed with FMD were not infectious, even if some were infected. We estimate how transmission
parameters varied through time, highlighting the impact of the control measures on the progression of the epidemic. We
demonstrate statistically significant evidence for assortative contact patterns between animals of the same species. Predictive
risk maps of the transmission potential in different geographic areas of GB are presented for the fitted models.
Citation: Chis Ster I, Ferguson NM (2007) Transmission Parameters of the 2001 Foot and Mouth Epidemic in Great Britain. PLoS ONE 2(6): e502.
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INTRODUCTION
The 2001 FMD epidemic in the UK had a substantial cost in
human, animal health and economic terms (Alexandersen et al.
[1], Kao [2]). Understanding the risk factors underlying the
transmission dynamics of that epidemic and evaluating the
effectiveness of the control measures are essential to minimise
the scale and cost of any future outbreak. Epidemic modelling
[3,4,5–7] proved critical to decision making about control policies
which were (in some cases controversially) adopted to control the
2001 epidemic [8–10]. Modelling now has a ‘peace-time’
contingency planning role.
One weakness of the modelling studies undertaken in 2001 was
the relatively ad-hoc nature of the parameter estimation methods
employed. In their first paper, Ferguson et al. [4] used maximum
likelihood methods to fit to the observed incidence time series, but
did not attempt to fit to the spatio-temporal pattern of spread. In
their later work, the same authors developed a more robust
method for estimating species-specific susceptibility and infectious-
ness parameters and spatial kernel parameters (see Supplementary
Information to [3]), but at the time the statistical basis for the
methods developed was lacking. In retrospect, the methods
developed turned out to be closely related to those developed
during the SARS epidemic by Wallinga and Teunis [11], although
the earlier work incorporated population denominator data to allow
for spatial- and species-based heterogeneity in disease transmission.
Nevertheless, the methods employed had the limitation of not being
fully parametric, meaning they could not be extended to fit arbitrary
transmission models to the observed data. Keeling et al. [5] used
maximum likelihood methods to estimate transmission parameters,
but it was also supplemented by more ad hoc least-squares matching
to regional incidence time series.
Therefore there remains a need to develop rigorous modern
statistical approaches for parameter estimation of non-linear
models for the 2001 FMD outbreak. Bayesian Markov Chain
Monte Carlo (MCMC) techniques are the best established such
methods and have been successfully employed in the analysis of
a range of spatiotemporal outbreak data in the past [12–14], as
well as to purely temporal incidence data [15,16]. Here we
develop MCMC-based inference models for the 2001 FMD
epidemic in GB. The models examine: the extent to which
transmission was spatially localised and the temporal variation in
transmission, species-specific variation in susceptibility, infectious-
ness and heterogeneity in contact rates between and within
species.
METHODS
Data
We take the farm as the unit of our study and ignore the possible
impact of within-farm epidemic dynamics. Thus we implicitly
assume disease spread within a farm is so rapid as to be practically
instantaneous, with all animals on a farm becoming infectious at
the same time.
Our data consists of information on all the farms in the UK
listed in the 2000 agricultural census [see http://www.defra.gov.
uk/footandmouth/cases/index.htm ]. There were a total of
134,986 farms listed in that dataset and uniquely identified by
their County/Parish/Holding (CPH) number. Their spatial
coordinates are provided together with the number of animals
by species within each farm. A partition of all GB farms according
to the animal types represented is shown in Figure 1a. Their
geographical distribution is represented in Figure 1b as the
number of farms per 565 km. Notice the high density areas in the
North West (Cumbria), South West (Devon), Wales and Scotland
where the main epidemic foci developed. There is also an area of
high density in the Shetland Islands corresponding to very small
crofter smallholdings. Figure 1c and d show the numbers of sheep
and cattle kept per 565 km square.
During the 2001 FMD outbreak, a total of 2026 infected premises
(IPs) were recorded – farms where FMD was diagnosed, and
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which were subsequently culled. The IP dataset contains, for each
farm, the estimated date of infection (determined by a clinical
evaluation of the age of lesions on affected animals), and the dates
of disease reporting, confirmation and culling.
A total of 7457 other (non-IP) farms were also culled – mostly as
contiguous premises (CPs, about 3103) or dangerous contacts (DCs, about
1287), but some under other local culling policies used in Cumbria
and Scotland. For instance about 1846 (79%) out of a total of 2342
sheep farms in Cumbria had all sheep culled under the ‘‘local
3 km radial sheep cull’’ policy adopted there. Some of the farms
(about 30) were recorded both as DCs and CPs. Multiple records
per farm were often found in the disease control management
system dataset, and it was often unclear whether this was due to
data entry errors or as a result of sequential species-specific culls on
the same farm. In our analysis we therefore considered the whole
farm to be culled at the last recorded date of culling.
The most frequent species are cattle and sheep (see Figure 1a).
There are less than 3% farms with pigs only and only 10 farms
with just pigs were diagnosed as IPs in 2001 (less than 1% of all the
IPs). This indicates a-priori that pigs contributed far less to the
2001 outbreak than many other FMD outbreaks (despite their
high levels of shedding [1,17]), and we therefore decided to discard
pigs-only farms from the current study to simplify the analysis. The
Sensitivity Analysis section shows that this simplification does not
significantly affect estimates of other epidemiological parameters.
We discarded another three IPs due to missing information or
possible mistakes regarding their location or number of animals,
leaving a total of 2013 IPs in our analysed dataset.
Model formulation
We model the epidemic as a space-time survival process [18]. The
total observation time T is the 240 days between 7th February and
5th October 2001. Each farm i at the location (xi, yi) is associated
with an infection time ti (if infected), a removal time ri (if
slaughtered) and two integers nci and n
s
i representing, respectively,
the number of cattle and sheep on the farm. Sc and Ss represent
per-capita cattle and sheep susceptibility, respectively, while Ic and
Is represent per capita cattle and sheep infectivity. The
susceptibility is a relative measure of animal sensitivity to the
disease whereas infectivity represents the infectious risk posed by
an animal to others. We use a continuous kernel to describe how
the probability of contact between farms scaled with distance.
Transmission is naturally assumed to decrease with the distance
Figure 1. GB livestock population in 2000. (a) GB livestock farms partitioned according to the animal species kept. (b) Map of density of livestock
farms. The number of livestock farms in each 565 km is plotted. (c) As (b) but plotting numbers of sheep kept per 565 km square. (d) As (c) for cattle.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0000502.g001
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between farms according to the power law
k dij
 
~ 1z
dij
a
 {c
ð1Þ
where dij represents the Euclidian distance between the infected
farm i and the susceptible farm j. The parameters a (kernel offset)
and c (kernel power) are to be estimated. The kernel captures all
forms of movement and contact between farms and as such, the
use of a simple 2 parameter function is inevitably a highly
simplified representation of the true complexity of inter-farm
contacts. We examined other functional forms for the kernel (such
as those used in some other analyses [19]) but the resulting model
fits were much poorer than found using the power-law kernel
above.
Given the susceptibility and infectiousness parameters and the
kernel, the infection hazard from an infected farm j to a susceptible
farm i is then quantified by
bij~ n
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This model is over-specified as stated, so we arbitrarily assume
Ss=1 throughout, meaning Sc represents the ratio of cattle-to-
sheep susceptibility. For a constant (distance-independent) kernel
this is just a mass-action closed epidemic model with heteroge-
neous susceptibility and infectiousness. This model assumes
susceptibility and infectiousness parameters scale linearly with
the number of animals of different species on the farm, a relatively
strong assumption imposed for model parsimony reasons. The
mixing matrix embedded in (2) quantifies the 4 species-specific
mixing rates between animals on different farms: cattle-to-cattle
(ScIc) sheep-to-cattle (ScIs), cattle-to-sheep (SsIc) and sheep-to-sheep
(SsIs). This model formulation is identical to that used by Keeling et
al. [5], except for the functional form of kernel used.
The force of infection on a susceptible farm i at time t depends on the
whole history of events and is just
li tð Þ~
P
j
bijLij tð Þ ð3Þ
where
Lij tð Þ~
1, if the farm i is susceptible and the farm j is
infectious at the time t
0, otherwise
8><
>: ð4Þ
By default, we assume a latent period of 1 day (latency is
represented within the function L); i.e. farms are infectious the day
after they are infected. However, we test the sensitivity of our
estimates to the assumption by also examining latent periods of 2
and 3 days.
The probability density function that farm i is infected at time t
is then given by
pinfectedi (t)~li tð Þ exp {
ðt
0
li tð Þdt
2
4
3
5
Hence, the contribution that a farm i, observed to be infected at
time t, makes to the log likelihood is just:
linfectedi ~ log li tð Þð Þ{
ðt
0
li tð Þdt ð5Þ
A farm which is not infected contributes to the overall likelihood
the probability that it escapes infection during the observation
period, i.e. until the time it is culled (ri) or for the duration of the
epidemic T, whichever is shorter. Its contribution to the log
likelihood is therefore
lnon infectedi ~{
ðmin (ri,T )
0
li tð Þdt ð6Þ
The total log likelihood of the model can be written as
l~
X
i
linfected farmsi z
X
i
lnon infected farmsi ð7Þ
We then extend the simple model above by introducing an
additional parameter to understand to what extent the trans-
mission within species is altered by between species transmission.
The parameter r quantifies the degree to which mixing between
species is assortative – with r,1 representing assortative mixing
and r.1 disassortative mixing. The interaction model still
assumes constant parameters with respect to time along the whole
observation period T. The mixing matrix defined in equation (2)
becomes
ScIc rScIs
rSsIc SsIs
 
ð8Þ
where we again fix Ss to be 1 to avoid model over specification.
The force of infection (3) and model log likelihood equation (7)
change accordingly.
Assuming transmission parameters were constant in time
throughout the epidemic is obviously a crude simplification.
However, allowing infectivity to vary continuously in time results
in an over-specified model and problems of parameter identifica-
tion and confounding. We therefore examined two sets of models
in which changes in transmission parameter were restricted to 2
significant points in time denoted by Tcut, namely 23
rd February
(when the national ban on animal movements was introduced) and
31st March (when control measures were intensified and the so
called 24/48 hour IP/CP culling policy was introduced). Models
were respectively fitted to the individual case data from the start of
the epidemic (conditioning on the first infection) or from after 23rd
February (conditioning on the 54 farms that were already infected
by that date). A detailed history of the epidemic is given by Kao
[9].
We separately fitted model variants which assumed a discrete
change in parameters on 23rd February and on 31st March.
Confounding meant that only a very limited number of
parameters could be varied in time, so we examined the effect
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of varying infectiousness and kernel parameters separately. We
fitted four separate time-varying model variants: (i) varying the
cattle infectivity by a factor and keeping sheep infectivity constant
through time (Cattle Infectivity model); (ii) varying sheep in-
fectivity by a factor but not cattle infectivity (Sheep Infectivity
model); (iii) varying both cattle and sheep infectivity by the same
ratio (Cattle & Sheep Infectivity model); (iv) varying the kernel
parameters (Time Varying Kernel model). For the last model
variant we also fitted a version which includes non-assortative
mixing between species (see equation (8)). Hence the most general
mathematical expression of the transmission model is:
bij tð Þ~ nci nsi
 |ﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄ}
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where
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(
and Is tð Þ~
Ipres , if tƒTcut
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The scripts pre and post are self-explanatory for time varying
parameters. When fitting models with time varying infectivity
parameters we actually fit Ipost and the ratio m= Ipre/Ipost we called
infectivity factor. This is a within species ratio, a parameter
directly fitted by the models, unlike the between species infectivity
ratio additionally calculated as explained later in the text (see
Parameter estimates section).
Note that all models above treat the epidemic as fully observed,
i.e. infection times are assumed to be known (when in fact only
estimated infection times are known – see Sensitivity Analysis
section), and only IPs are assumed to be infectious.
Statistical inference and model comparison
We adopt a Bayesian framework for statistical inference and use
MCMC methods for fitting the model to individual case data. This
is not strictly necessary, given our simplifying assumption that the
epidemic was completely observed, but it provides a more
consistent and robust framework within which to relax that
assumption in future work.
We obtained parameter estimates and equal-tailed 95% credible
intervals from the marginal posterior distributions of the fitted
parameters. For the basic model for instance we estimated the
relative cattle susceptibility, Sc, two infectivity parameters (Ic(t);Ic
and Is(t);Is for all t) and two kernel parameters (c(t);cpost;cpre;c
and a(t);apost;apre;a for all t).
We used the posterior mean deviance as a Bayesian measure of
fit or model adequacy as defined by Spiegelhalter et al. [20]. The
posterior density deviance is defined as:
D hð Þ~{2 log P yjhð Þf gzC
where log{P(y|h)} is the log-likelihood function for the observed
data vector y given the parameter vector h and C is a constant
which does not need to be known for model-comparison purposes
(being a function of the data alone). The smaller the mean
posterior deviance, the better the corresponding model fits the
data.
If the posterior deviance distributions for two different models
overlap significantly, it is necessary to use additional criteria to
compare model fit – namely a comparison of the relative
complexity of the models. The Deviance Information Criterion
(DIC) is perhaps the most general of such methods, being
a generalisation of the Akaike information criterion for Bayesian
hierarchical models [20]. We define the complexity of a model by
its effective number of parameters, pD, defined as
pD~E D hð Þ½ {D E h½ ð Þ
where E[ ] represents taking expectations (the posterior average).
The DIC is then defined as
DIC~pDzE D hð Þ½ 
A lower value of DIC corresponds to a better model. This
criterion offers flexibility for comparing non-nested models [20]
and it is straightforwardly computed within an MCMC algorithm.
We applied the classic random walk Metropolis Hastings
algorithm [21,22] and a block-sampling of parameters due to
the computationally expensive form of the likelihood [23,24]. A
log scale has been used for sampling as the parameters were all
positive definite and were expected to potentially vary by orders of
magnitude. However, linear scale sampling yielded similar results.
The convergence of the chains was also very much improved (see
Robert [25] for more on perfect sampling and reparameterization
issues) compared with sampling on a linear scale. The model was
coded in C and parallelized using OpenMP 2.0.
The MCMC sampler was allowed to equilibrate with
convergence being evaluated visually from the likelihood and
parameter traces. For the simpler models, 5,000 iterations were
sufficient for equilibration, while this increased to 20,000 for the
most complex models. Also, using log scale sampling, we verified
that the chains were able to converge even if started with initial
parameter values far from the final posterior mean values.
Posterior distributions were estimated from 100,000 iterations.
The rate of the acceptance varies from model to model. For the
baseline model we achieved a 25% rate of acceptance and for the
most complex model (8 parameters), a rate of approx 10%. These
values compare well with the ‘‘golden’’ acceptance rate for
Random Walk Metropolis Hastings of 23% (Roberts [26]).
We did not encounter common problems in MCMC estimation
like slow convergence and slow mixing (O’Neill [27]). There were
some correlations between parameters, mostly having biological
explanations (cattle and sheep infectivity for instance), but a careful
parameterization lowers them. We verified parameter estimates
were not dependent on parameterization choices – e.g. no
difference was seen whether we fitted species infectivity in-
dividually, or just fitted sheep infectivity and then the ratio of
cattle-to-sheep infectivity.
RESULTS
Parameter estimates
Table 1 lists the parameter estimates we obtained for a set of fitted
models conditioned only on the first infection whereas Table 2
presents the estimates for models conditioned on infections
Britain 2001 FMD Epidemic
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occurring up to 23rd February. The posterior deviances for each
set of models are plotted in Figure 2a and Figure 2b, respectively.
Figure 2a illustrates some clear conclusions. Of the two models
without time variation in parameters, the interaction model fits
significantly better than the baseline model without heterogeneous
mixing between species. However, fitting the interaction model
broadened the credible intervals of the infectivity parameter
estimates (Table 1), indicating (unsurprisingly) slight confounding
between the 4 infectivity and susceptibility parameters.
Of the models which allowed infectivity to vary on 23rd
February, allowing only cattle infectivity variation gave a slightly
better fit than varying sheep infectivity or both. However, of the
models with parameters which vary on 23rd February, the model
variants which allow the 2 kernel parameters to vary at that time
point fit substantially better (by both deviance and DIC criteria,
see Table 1) than those which just allow a species-specific variation
in infectivity. This is encouraging for the inference procedure, as
the main control measure initiated on that date was the banning of
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Figure 2. Posterior deviances. (a) Models conditioned on the first infection with parameters change at 23rd February. (b) Models conditioned on 23rd
February with parameters change at 31st March.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0000502.g002
Table 1. Models conditioned on the first infection and 23rd February time changing point if applicable. (95% equal-tailed credible
intervals).
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Model
Baseline
model
Interaction
model
Cattle
Infectivity
model
Sheep
Infectivity
model
Cattle & Sheep
Infectivity model
Time Varying
Kernel model
Time Varying
Kernel + Inter-
action model
Estimates Mean (SD)
Equal tailed 95% Credible Interval
Susceptibility Ratio Sc:
Sc
Ss
 
6.86 (0.44)
(6.04,7.76)
5.95 (0.57)
(4.93, 7.09)
6.83 (0.44)
(6.02, 7.76)
6.81 (0.46)
(5.99, 7.77)
6.80 (0.45)
(5.97, 7.73)
6.74 (0.45)
(5.97, 7.73)
5.71 (0.55)
(4.62, 6.78)
Cattle Inf (Ic) (610
8) (Overall or Post 23 Feb) 8.60 (1.06)
(6.69, 10.8)
11.9 (1.88)
(8.68, 15.90)
8.29 (0.99)
(6.47, 10.40)
8.55 (1.07)
(6.57, 10.80)
8.29 (0.99)
(6.63, 10.50)
8.31 (0.98)
(6.63, 10.50)
11.7 (1.89)
(8.64, 16.00)
Sheep Inf (Is) (610
8) (Overall or Post 23 Feb) 1.43 (0.18)
(1.11, 1.82)
2.16 (0.31)
(1.65, 2.82)
1.37(0.17)
(1.05, 1.71)
2.47 (0.55)
(6.63, 10.50)
1.34 (0.17)
(1.05, 1.71)
1.30 (0.17)
(1.04, 1.7)
2.00 (0.28)
(1.52, 2.62)
Assortativity Factor (r) 0.47 (0.075)
(0.33, 0.63)
0.45 (0.075)
(0.31, 0.61)
Inf factor (m) Pre:Post 23rd Feb 3.17 (0.58)
(2.11, 4.38)
2.47 (0.55)
(1.54, 3.71)
2.11 (0.29)
(1.57, 2.70)
Kernel power (Pre 23rd Feb) 1.72 (0.098)
(1.54, 1.93)
1.69 (0.10)
(1.51, 1.92)
Kernel offset (Pre 23rd Feb) 690 (160)
(414, 1066)
694 (166)
(376, 1035)
Kernel power (Overall or Post 23rd Feb) 2.58 (0.05)
(2.49, 2.67)
2.56 (0.05)
(2.47, 2.66)
2.56 (0.05)
(2.50, 2.68)
2.58 (0.05)
(2.49, 2.68)
2.58 (0.05)
(2.50, 2.67)
2.68 (0.05)
(2.58, 2.78)
2.67 (0.05)
(2.56, 2.77)
Kernel offset (Overall or Post 23rd Feb) 1190 (104)
(1006,1412)
1175 (106)
(978, 1389)
1212 (102)
(1030, 1432)
1203 (108)
(1014, 1434)
1207 (97)
(1029, 1407)
1329 (118)
(1098, 1560)
1317 (116)
(1103, 1151)
Posterior deviance 29687 29662 29668 29684 29672 29555 29529
Complexity 4.6 5.1 5.7 5.7 5.7 6.5 7.2
DIC 29691 29667 29674 29689 29678 29561 29536
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0000502.t001..
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all animal movements – which would be expected to have a major
impact on the spatial component of the transmission. We found
strong evidence for the kernel decaying much more rapidly with
distance after 23rd February, with cpre=1.72 (1.54, 1.93) before
23rd February and cpost=2.68 (2.58, 2.78) after that date (Figure 3a
and Figure 3b). The parameter estimates are less precise before
23rd February (Table 1) due to the relatively small number of IPs
(about 57) before that date.
Looking at the most complex model (namely the interaction
model with time varying kernel), cattle were estimated to be 5.7-
fold (4.6, 6.8) more susceptible than sheep (see Figure 3c and
Table 1). Rather than mentioning animals’ specific infectivity (see
Figure 3d and Table 1), it is more informative to comment on the
cattle:sheep infectivity ratio parameter for the most complex fit
(this ratio does dot appear in the tables as it is not a model
parameter). We calculated it within the MCMC algorithm as the
ratio of the two species infectiousness for each sampled parameter
point. The most complex model suggests that cattle are 5.95-fold
(4.54, 7.63) more infectious than sheep (Figure 3e).
The parameter quantifying assortativity in mixing was estimated
at r=0.45 (0.31, 0.61) – well below 1, the level at which mixing
between species is random (Figure 3f). By comparison with the
model with a time varying kernel but random mixing between
species, the effect of heterogeneous mixing between species
modified the between-species transmission as given by matrix
(1.9) as indicated below.
56:01 8:76
8:31 1:30
 !
?
66:81 5:14
5:26 2:00
 !
random mixing assortative mixing
ð11Þ
Cattle-to-cattle and sheep-to-sheep transmission is higher (by 19%
and 54% respectively) for the model with non-random mixing,
whereas the sheep-to-cattle and cattle-to-sheep transmissions
dropped by 41% and 37 % respectively.
Conditioned on 23rd February, 7 model variants have been
considered (Table 2 and Figure 2b). We examined the baseline
and interaction models (no change in parameters over time),
allowing cattle infectivity to vary on 31st March and both cattle
and sheep infectivity to vary by the same factor after 31st March
(with and without heterogeneity in mixing) and allowing both
kernel parameters to vary on 31st March.
Unsurprisingly, the kernel parameters were not significantly
different if allowed to be different before and after 31st March,
neither did this model prove to be the best fit. Overall, while the
variations in mean deviance (Figure 2b) seen between model
variants were much smaller than for the models conditioned on
the first infection (Figure 2a), the interaction model allowing for
time varying cattle infectivity gave the most adequate fit (measured
by both mean deviance and DIC, see Table 2).
We cannot statistically compare the two sets of models in
Table 1 and Table 2, as the data used are different for the two
cases. However, the parameter estimates from the best-fitting
models of each table are largely consistent. Each post-23rd
February estimated value from the best-fit model in Table 1 is
included in the corresponding pre-31st March 95% credible
interval of the best fit model in Table 2 (and vice-versa).
The most important message from the second set of models is
that all models with cattle time varying infectivity (best fit)
indicated higher values of infectivity after 31st March than before
(m=0.73 (0.63, 0.83)) (Table 2). This may seem paradoxical but
reflects the fact that while culling (the effect of which is explicitly
included in the input data) dramatically reduced case incidence in
Table 2. Models conditioned on 23rd February and 31st March time changing point if applicable.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Models
Baseline
model
Interact
model
Cattle
Infectivity
model
Cattle & Sheep
Infectivity
model
Cattle &Sheep
Infectivity +Inter
model
Cattle Infectivity
+ Interaction
model
Time Varying
Kernel model
Estimates Mean (SD)
Equal tailed 95% Credible Interval
Susceptibility Ratio Sc:
Sc
Ss
 
7.24 (0.47)
(6.37, 8.21)
6.36 (0.57)
(5.25, 7.50)
7.35 (0.49)
(6.46, 8.34)
7.34 (0.49)
(6.44, 8.35)
5.95 (0.54)
(4.95, 7.03)
6.08 (0.6)
(4.95, 7.30)
7.35 (0.54)
(6,32, 8.49)
Cattle Inf (Ic) (610
8) (Overall or Post 31st Mar) 7.64 (1.0)
(5.86, 9.75)
10.30(1.60)
(7.55, 13.7)
8.9 (1.17)
(6.8, 11.4)
8.41 (1.1)
(6.46, 10.8)
12.1 (1.81)
(9.02, 16.1)
13.5 (2.21)
(9.73, 18.2)
7.81 (0.54)
(6.32, 8.49)
Sheep Inf (Is) (610
8) (Overall or Post 31st Mar) 1.31 (0.18)
(0.98, 1.70)
1.93 (0.27)
(1.45, 2.51)
1.32 (0.18)
(1.01, 1.71)
1.43 (0.19)
(1.07, 1.86)
2.24 (0.3)
(1.71, 2.91)
2.27 (0.3)
(1.71, 3)
1.33 (0.17)
(1.04, 1.72)
Assortativity Factor (r) 0.49 (0.08)
(0.34, 0.67)
0.51 (0.08)
(0.36, 0.68)
0.45 (0.08)
(0.3, 0.6)
Infectivity factor (m) Pre:Post 31st March 0.73 (0.05)
(0.63, 0.83)
0.85 (0.04)
(0.77, 0.92)
0.88 (0.04)
(0.81, 0.97)
0.72 (0.05)
(0.62, 0.82)
Kernel power (Pre 31st Mch) 2.61 (0.06)
(2.50, 2.73)
Kernel offset (Pre 31st March) 1216 (115)
(1015, 1464)
Kernel power (Overall or Post 31st March) 2.68 (0.06)
(2.58, 2.8)
2.67 (0.06)
(2.57, 2.78)
2.69 (0.06)
(2.58, 2.7)
2.68 (0.05)
(2.58, 2.7)
2.67 (0.05)
(2.57, 2.78)
2.67 (0.05)
(2.57, 2.78)
2.74 (0.07)
(2.62, 2.89)
Kernel offset (Overall or Post 31st March) 1344 (131)
(1114, 1617)
1334 (123)
(1116,1601)
1353 (128)
(1114, 1629)
1339 (123)
(1117, 1630)
1308 (114)
(1092, 1543)
1312 (120)
(1078, 1552)
1437 (130)
(1192, 1709)
Posterior deviance 28144 28122 28128 28136 27981 27968 28140
Complexity 4.6 4.9 5.6 5.4 6.3 6.5 6.9
DIC 28149 28128 28134 28142 27987 27975 28148
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0000502.t002..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
.
Britain 2001 FMD Epidemic
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 6 June 2007 | Issue 6 | e502
02
4
6
 
.2 .4 .6 .8
  
0
.2
.4
.6
2 4 6 8 10
 
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
4 5 6 7 8 9
Time varying kernel
Time varying kernel+interaction
0
.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
 
 
0 5 10 15 20
Cattle infectivity Cattle infectivity
Sheep infectivity Sheep infectivity
Time varying kernel     Time varying kernel+interaction
0
2
4
6
8
1 1.5 2 2.5 3
Kernel power pre 23rd Feb
Kernel power post 23rd Feb
0.00001
0.0001
0.001
0.01
0.1
2k
m
10
km
20
km
50
km
10
0k
m
distance between farms
Pre 23rd February
Post 23rd February
(a) (b)
(e) (f )
(c) (d)
Figure 3. Posterior densities for the estimated parameters from the most complex models conditioned on the first infection allowing for
parameter changes on 23rd Feb and interaction. (a) Spatial kernel powers c pre and post 23rd February. (b) Pre and post 23rd February estimated
kernels, a log-log scale plot. (c) Susceptibility ratios cattle:sheep and (d) Animals infectivity parameters as modified by interaction in time varying
kernel model. (e) Infectivity ratio cattle:sheep as calculated from the most complex model. (f) Assortativity parameter.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0000502.g003
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April, from May to September 2001, case incidence maintained
itself at a low level – but almost entirely within cattle farms. This
increase in cattle infectivity may therefore really reflect the impact
of reduced biosecurity and/or increased non-compliance with
movement controls.
Risk maps
It is informative to examine what our parameter estimates imply in
terms of geographic variation in transmission potential. Given the
parameter estimates for each model, we can define the relative risk
of transmission an infectious farm j would pose to all susceptible
farms in the country rj:
rj~ Icn
c
jzIsn
s
j
 P
i=j
Sc
Ss
ncizn
s
i
 
|k dij
  ð12Þ
This quantity multiplied by the average duration of infectiousness
of a farm (time from end of latency to culling) gives the
reproduction number R0j of the farm j. We divided the UK into
5 km squares and then calculated the average transmission risk of
all farms in each square (local R0). Figure 4 shows how geographic
risk changed before and after 23rd February for our best fit model
conditioned on the first infection. The kernel shape has a major
influence on the average risk distribution throughout the country.
Figure 5 shows the corresponding risk maps for the estimates
inferred from our best fit model conditioned on 23rd February. A
slightly higher risk is predicted after 31st March by the model
conditioned on 23rd February due to the increase in the cattle
infectivity after this date. The risk estimates after 23rd February
from the first set of models appear consistent with those obtained
from the models conditioned on 23rd February, though a rigorous
statistical comparison is not appropriate.
Figure 4. Maps of transmission risk (potential R0) before 23
rd February (a) and after (b) as predicted from the interaction model with time
varying kernel conditioned on the first infection (Table 1 and text).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0000502.g004
Figure 5. Transmission risk map (a) before 31st March and (b) after 31st March calculated from the interaction model with time varying cattle
infectivity conditioned on 23rd February (Table 2 and text).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0000502.g005
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Infections in proactively culled farms
We have made the strong assumption for this study that the only
infected farms during the 2001 epidemic were the reported IPs,
and hence that any farms which were infected but culled before
clinical diagnosis were not responsible for causing any infections. It
is therefore interesting to calculate how many of the proactively
culled farms our model predicts might have been infected (but, by
definition, not diagnosed).
To calculate the probability pi that a particular proactively
culled farm i was infected, we need to adjust the infection hazard
by the probability that the farm would have not been reported as
a clinical case before its culling date Tic. From the outbreak data,
we calculate the probability density of the time from infection to
report for reported IPs and hence the cumulative probability
distribution of the time from infection to report, denoted by F.
Then, with li(t) being the force of infection on a proactively culled
farm i at time t (from the best fit model conditioned on 23rd
February), the probability that that farm gets infected and escapes
reporting between its potential infection time and culling time Tic is
pi~1{ exp {
ÐTic
0
li tð Þ 1{F Tic{t
  	
dt
 !
: ð13Þ
We calculate the expected number of infections in different classes
(e.g. DCs, CPs) of proactively culled farms culled within
a particular time interval (Tic[ T0,T1½ ). For instance, the expected
number of CPs culled at the time Tic[ T0,T1½  which are predicted
to have been infected can be formally written as
P
i[CP,Tic[ T0,T1½ 
pi ð14Þ
This is a simplification, as in reality the delay from infection to
report almost certainly depends on the size and species mix on
a farm, but the result is nevertheless indicative of the expected level
of infection in proactive culling. Also, at this stage, the calculations
are made as if culling was a non-informative censoring process.
This is a reasonable assumption for all proactively culled farms
except for DCs (which by definition had been identified by
veterinarian as having had a high risk of exposure) but our method
may underestimate the infection rate. In calculating the infection
to report delay distributions, we divided the epidemic after 23rd
February into 3 time periods: 23rd February–31st March, 31st
March–1st May and 1st May–5th October. In these intervals a total
of 1332, 4498 and 1627 farms were slaughtered, respectively. Our
best fit model conditioned on 23rd February predicts different
infectivity regimes before and after 31st March (see Parameter
Estimates and Table 2) but we split further the second period of
time due to different delays in reporting to culling. The infection to
report delay is 8.6 and 8.8 days for the last two periods of time
respectively but the infection to cull delay drops from 9.4 and 8.8
days respectively.
Applying this approach to the interaction model with time
varying cattle infectivity which conditioned on the 23rd of
February, we calculated the expected proportion of proactively
culled farms which were infected. We estimate that approximately
1.3% (1%, 1.6%) of 7457 culled non-IP farms may have been
infected – 97 in total (Figure 6a). Of the 1332 farms culled between
23rd February and 31st March, 1.7% (1%, 2.4%) may have been
infected (23 farms). Of the 4498 farms culled between 31st March
and 1st May, we estimate 0.7% (0.5%, 1%) were infected (34
farms). In the period 1st May to 5th October, we estimate that
1.6% (1%, 2.3%) of 1627 farms culled were infected (27 farms).
The proportion of CPs estimated to have been infected is 2%
(1.5%, 2.5%), equating to 62 farms (Figure 6b). Over the whole
epidemic, we estimated 1.5% (0.8%, 2.1%) of farms designated as
DCs were infected (19 farms). This estimate (Figure 6c) does not
allow for higher risk of infection implied by the veterinary
judgement that led to those DCs being identified, which may
mean that a higher proportion were in fact infected. If we assume
that DCs were 3 times more likely to be infected due to their status
than the model would predict, then the incidence of infection in
DCs goes up accordingly, i.e. to 4.6% or 59 farms.
Farms culled neither as DCs or CPs (typically those culled under
the 3 km and local sheep cull policies in the Cumbria, Dumfries
and Galloway areas) had the lowest estimated rate of infection –
a mere 0.5 % (0.2%, 0.8%) or 16 out of 3067 farms.
Sensitivity Analysis
In this section we examine the sensitivity of our results to a number
of factors: leaving pigs out of the analysis, possible errors in the
estimated IP infection dates, and the assumed latent period.
To justify the simplification of the analysis by discarding the
number of pigs in a farm, we present some more detailed statistics
regarding this variable. We also fit the simplest model conditioned
on the first infection including it into the analysis. Out of all
reportedly infected farms 2026, 95% (approx. 1921 farms) of them
have no pigs, 3% (about 80 farms) have less than 100 pigs and only
0.7% (about 14) have between 100 and 1000 pigs. There are only
4 big farms with 1110, 1400, 2000 and 4500 pigs from which only
(a) (b) (c)
0.0%
1.0%
2.0%
3.0%
4.0%
1 2 3 4  538     490       259   1287
0.0%
1.0%
2.0%
3.0%
4.0%
1 2 3 4379    1528    1196    3103
0.0%
1.0%
2.0%
3.0%
4.0%
1 2 3 4
1332    4498    1627    7457
Figure 6. The estimated proportions of infections and their 95% CI for proactively culled farms. (a) Total number of proactively culled farms. (b)
CPs culled farms (c) DCs culled farms. The first 3 figures on x-axis represent, in order, the numbers of farms culled within each epidemic stage we
considered whereas the last figure represents the total number of culled farms after 23rd Feb onwards.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0000502.g006
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the last two farms are exclusively pig farms. We denote by n
p
i ,Sp,Ip
the number of pigs in farm i, pigs susceptibility and pigs infectivity
respectively. The simplest model similar to (1.2) conditioned on the
first infection has been fitted, reducing the number of parameters
in the same manner.
l t,xi,yið Þ~ Sc
Ss
ncizn
s
iz
Sp
Ss
n
p
i
 
|
X
j
Icn
c
jzIsn
s
jzIpn
p
j
 
k dij
 
Lij tð Þ
ð15Þ
In addition we estimated pig:sheep susceptibility ratio and pig
infectivity, assuming all parameters constant through time. We
found that cattle:sheep susceptibility ratio is 6.8 (sd 0.44), 95% CI
(5.99, 7.72). Cattle and sheep infectivity estimates are 8.44 (sd 0.1)
95%CI (6.68, 10.6) and 1.38 (sd 0.18) 95% CI (1.08, 1.77)
respectively (the last two are scaled by a factor of 108). The kernel
estimates are 2.58 (sd 0.05) 95%CI (2.49, 2.67) and 1186 (sd 100)
95% (999, 1392) for power and offset, respectively. We learned
from this model that pigs are less susceptible than sheep, i.e.
pigs:sheep susceptibility ratio is estimated at 0.27 (sd 0.09) 95%CI
(0.14, 0.48). Also, cattle are more infective than pigs by a factor of
1.89 (sd 0.49) 95%CI (1.18, 3.07), but pigs are more infective than
sheep by a factor of 3.43 (sd 0.85) 95%CI (1.95, 5.27). A quick
comparison with Table 1 shows parameter estimates for cattle and
sheep are largely unaffected by ignoring the pig population, with
none of the estimates from the two analyses being significantly
different. We conclude that including pigs would not change the
conclusions presented in Table 1 regarding cattle and sheep (given
the very small number of IPs which had pigs) but it would decrease
the power of the analysis and increase model complexity.
To understand to what extent our estimates are affected by the
assumption that the infection dates have been accurately observed,
we randomized the estimated infection dates by adding a Gaussian
noise with zero mean and a standard deviation of 2 days. This is
motivated by the substantial proportion in the observed standard
deviation (73.5% less or equal than 2 days) of the distribution time
from the estimated infection date to the report date of IPs. We
then fitted the simplest model (conditioned on both first infection
and 23rd February) to 10 such randomised datasets. The average
estimates across them are given in Table 3. They lie well within
the confidence intervals we predicted in Table 1. The average
cattle:sheep infectivity ratio is also very close to the values
estimated using the original data.
The average estimates across 10 randomized datasets using the
most appropriate model conditioned on 23rd February (i.e. cattle
infectivity and interaction model) are also in Table 3. The values
are within the 95%CI presented in Table 2. We assessed a sensitivity
analysis for the estimated proportion of infections in proactively
culled farms (see the previous section) with respect to infection times.
Using the predicted parameters for each dataset, we calculated the
average proportions across all of them, for each category of
proactively culled farms. The average proportion of infections
between DC farms is 1.37% (2%, 0.78% and 0.72% for each period
of time, respectively). For CP farms, the same quantities evaluate to
1.9% with 1.8%, 1.3% and 1.98%, respectively. Overall proactively
culled farms, we obtained an average percentage of 1.25% with
1.64%, 0.81% and 1.6% for each considered period of time. All the
values are well within the 95%CIs predicted by the original data (see
the previous section and Figure 6).
All the results presented above assume a fixed latent period of 1
day. We tested the sensitivity of parameter estimates to this
assumption by examining latent periods of 2 and 3 days. Overall,
we would expect infectiousness parameters to increase to
compensate for the shorter infectious period, and thus slightly
increased generation time (namely the mean time from infection of
one case and the time of infection of the cases that case generates).
Interestingly, however, it is the kernel parameter estimates which
are altered as the latent period is varied with the kernel becoming
slightly less local with increasing latent period. For two and three
days latent period, pre 23rd February, the values of c dropped from
1.69 (Table 1) to 1.51 and 1.46 respectively. After this date the
same parameter estimate dropped from 2.67 (Table 1) to 2.64 and
2.59 respectively. This may reflect the fact that increasing the
latent period decreases the prevalence and therefore density of
infectious farms, thereby increasing the expected mean distance
over which infection events occur.
DISCUSSION
This paper has presented a statistical analysis of the spatiotemporal
evolution of the 2001 foot and mouth outbreak in GB.
Qualitatively, the results agree with those obtained by Keeling et
al. [5] in identifying cattle as being the key species in the 2001
epidemic. Using the interaction model conditioned on 23rd
February with time varying cattle infectivity, we estimated that
88% of IPs between 23rd Feb–31st March were infected by cattle
and only 12% by sheep. Sheep-to-sheep transmission only
accounts for 3.1% of IPs in that period. After 31st March (when
we estimated that cattle infectivity increased slightly, see Table 2)
Table 3. Average estimates from 10 datasets with randomized infection times (see text).
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Models
Baseline model (cond on
the first infection)
Baseline model (cond on
23rd Feb)
Cattle Infectivity + Interaction
(cond on 23rd Feb)
Average estimates Mean
Susceptibility Ratio Sc:
Sc
Ss
 
6.94 7.23 6.24
Cattle Inf (Ic) (610
8) (Overall or Post 31stMar) 7.15 6.69 11.58
Sheep Inf (Is) (610
8) (Overall or Post 31stMar) 1.27 1.19 2.02
Cattle:Sheep Infectivity (additionally calculated) 5.68 5.64
Assortativity Factor (r) 0.46
Infectivity factor (m) Pre:Post 31st March 0.70
Kernel power 2.62 2.72 2.71
Kernel offset 1327 1471 1445
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0000502.t003..
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91% of the IPs were infected by cattle and 8.9% by sheep, with
sheep-to-sheep transmission accounting for only 2.3% of infec-
tions. While these levels of transmission from sheep farms are even
smaller than previously thought [5], they are consistent with the
results of experimental analysis [28] which indicate sheep cannot
sustain an epidemic of the Pan O Asian strain of FMD virus.
Allowing for non-random mixing between species indicates
contacts between farms are assortative on the basis of species
composition of the farm; i.e. like species mix with like. This agrees
with intuition about the nature of farming practices (e.g. sharing of
personnel and equipment is likely to be more common if 2 farms
have the same livestock species). The implications of the moderate
degree of assortativity we found for control measures remains to be
explored.
We did not use data collected during the epidemic on traced
contacts between farms to fix the spatial kernel function in our
analysis, since in the final version of the FMD epidemic data
warehouse [http://www.defra.gov.uk/footandmouth/cases/in-
dex.htm] very few of the contacts apparently identified early in
the epidemic remain confirmed. Also we shared the concern of
earlier work that the distribution of contact distances in traced
contacts may well be biased [3]. We therefore estimated the kernel
function, using an offset power-law functional form. The higher
value of the kernel power parameter we estimated after 23rd
February (2.67 vs. 1.70 before – Figure 3a) is consistent with the
expected dramatic shortening in the typical contact distance
following the national movement ban. This localized spread
together with the higher estimated level of infectivity in cattle after
31st March explains the long tail of the epidemic seen in 2001.
In estimating the transmission risk between farms, we assumed
a dependence on the Euclidian distance between them. In reality,
other metrics (e.g. the time required to travel between two farms)
might be more reasonable, and should be examined in future
work. We also did not include information on landscape (e.g.
height above sea-level, location of rivers, trees etc).
The estimated risk maps (Figure 4 and Figure 5) match the areas
of the country where highest case incidence rates were seen – with
the notable exception of Wales. The discrepancy between the high
predicted risk in Wales and the small number of cases observed
may reflect inaccuracies in the input data set - Keeling et al. [5]
reduced farm-level sheep population numbers by 30% in Wales
and obtained a better geographic match to the data (Matt Keeling,
personal communication). However, the discrepancy may also
reflect model inadequacy. We have not here allowed for other
farm-level risk factors, such as the farm fragmentation index
considered by Ferguson et al. [3]. We have not explored more
complex non-linear models of the dependence of susceptibility and
infectiousness on the number of animals on a farm or relaxed our
implicit assumption that contact rates between farms scale linearly
with the local density of farms. All these assumptions are being
relaxed in ongoing work.
The most important issue to be revised in future work is to allow
for proactively culled farms which were not diagnosed as IPs to be
potentially infected and infectious to other farms. This requires
modification of the inference model used to allow for an arbitrary
number of unobserved infections. The very low numbers of
proactively culled farms we estimated as infected suggested that
the effect of this model refinement may be limited. It should be
noted though that these infection prevalence estimates are in part
a result of the relatively non-local kernel estimated simultaneously.
If kernel estimates change in a refined analysis – and if DCs were
attributed a much higher risk of infection than estimated here due
to their status – then it is possible that estimated infection rates in
DCs and other proactively culled farms may increase somewhat.
However, even if these factors increased our estimated infection
prevalence among proactively culled farms 5 fold (which seems
unlikely from ongoing work), it would still mean that only a small
proportion (,10%) of DCs and CPs culled were infected. This
does not imply that proactive culling had no effect on the epidemic
– as the largest expected effect of such culling is via the targeted
depletion of susceptible animals. In this regard, proactive culling
has the same epidemiological impact as vaccination. Future work
will revisit past estimates of exactly how important such culling was
for the control of the 2001 FMD epidemic.
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